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The trade-off between cash and a debit card as a means of pay- 
ment is incorporated into a search-theoretic model. A buyer incurs 
the proportional cost of carrying cash into the decentralized goods 
market, and a seller accepting a debit card bears a fixed record- 
keeping cost. In an equilibrium, the price of a cash good turns out 
to be relatively sticky compared with that of a debit-card good. With 
money supply increasing at a constant rate, the carrying cost of 
cash proportional to its amount causes the cash balance net of cost 
to increase at a rate less than the money growth rate. Consumption 
smoothing also leads to a relatively small decrease in quantity traded 
in comparison with the increase in cash balance, implying rigid price. 
Further, the means-of-payment mechanism underlying price rigidity 
yields an additional distortionary effect of inflation on relative price 
between cash trade and debit-card trade, which implies higher wel- 
fare cost of inflation than that in the standard search-based model.
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I. Introduction
In the real world, we can easily observe that some prices are quite 
sticky, whereas others change very frequently. Bils and Klenow (2004) 
examine price changes of 350 categories of goods and services to show 
that price rigidity varies tremendously across goods. Recently, Boivin et 
al. (2009) have shown that prices of many goods appear sticky in re- 
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sponse to monetary policy and macroeconomic disturbances, whereas 
those same prices respond quickly to sector-specific shocks that affect 
the relative price of the good compared with other goods.
Price rigidity has been shown to be associated to some extent with 
means of payment. Using hand-collected data around Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
in the US, Knotek (2010) shows that convenient prices, which simplify 
and expedite transactions, are set for goods and services typically pur- 
chased with cash. Moreover, Knotek (2008) finds that convenience pricing 
is a source of price rigidity. These two findings imply that the prices of 
cash goods would be stickier than those purchased with other means of 
payment. Levy and Young (2004) claim that the unusual price rigidity 
of the 6.5-ounce Coke in 1886-1959 is associated with monetary deno- 
mination, nickel. Finkelstein (2009) also finds that the adoption of elec- 
tronic toll collection systems, such as E-ZPass, I-Pass, or Fast-Track, 
has caused an increase in tollway fee. Despite these invocations, an ex- 
plicit modeling of the relationship between price rigidity and means of 
payment is rarely found.
The goal of this paper is to provide a micro-foundation for price rigidity 
in connection with means of payment.1 Specifically, we consider a stand- 
ard search-based model of exchange (e.g., Lagos and Wright 2005) aug- 
mented with the choice of means of payment, cash or debit card, in 
response to monetary policy.2 In the centralized market, each agent hold- 
ing a given amount of monetary wealth chooses a means of payment 
together with money balance carried into the decentralized market, where 
each agent is randomly matched with another agent. In pairwise meet- 
ings, agents cannot commit to their future actions and trading histories 
are private. Hence, all trades should be quid pro quo in the sense that 
1 There has been a growing literature on the New Keynesian dynamic stochas- 
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with a reduced-form approach to price or 
wage rigidity; see, e.g., Yun (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Jung (2003), 
Smets and Wouters (2003), and Woodford (2003).
2 Williamson and Wright (2009) incorporate sticky prices into a version of 
Lagos and Wright (2005) to show that policy implications are similar to those in 
Woodford (2003), but there are also differences due to microeconomic details. 
Craig and Rocheteau (2008) have another version of a search-based model of ex- 
change with sticky prices. However, these studies assume price rigidity as in the 
New Keynesian DSGE models. Head et al. (2010) develop a search-based model 
in which price rigidity arises endogenously. In the presence of search frictions, 
expected profit from posting a high or low price may be the same for some sellers 
if aggregate distribution of real prices remains invariant to an increase in money 
supply.
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either cash or debit-card deposit should be transferred in exchange for 
goods in a single-coincidence meeting in which the terms of trade are 
determined by a buyer's take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Although either cash or debit-card deposit can be used as a means of 
payment in pairwise trades, they are not identical assets. Cash holdings 
entail forgone interest income as well as the risk of loss, theft, and in- 
convenience of carrying them from the centralized market to the decen- 
tralized market. Alternatively, debit-card deposit is free from the risk of 
loss or theft, and there is negligible inconvenience of carrying a debit 
card. However, unlike cash transaction, debit-card transaction requires 
record-keeping cost.3 This trade-off between cash and a debit card as a 
means of payment is reflected in the model economy by assuming that 
a buyer incurs the carrying cost of cash proportional to its amount, and 
a seller accepting a debit card bears a fixed record-keeping cost. Essen- 
tially, this transaction technology is equivalent to the approach taken by 
Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Karni (1973), and more recently by Freeman 
and Kydland (2000).
We consider equilibria in which the real balance of monetary wealth 
is constant so that the purchasing power of money in the “frictionless” 
centralized market depreciates at a given growth rate of money supply. 
First, we show that, for a given carrying cost of cash per unit, if a fixed 
record-keeping cost associated with debit transaction is sufficiently large, 
cash is used as a means of payment in all trades, whereas a debit card 
is used in all trades if record-keeping cost is sufficiently small. If the 
record-keeping cost is neither too small nor too large, both cash and 
debit card are used as means of payment.
Second, the price of cash good is relatively sticky compared with that 
of debit-card good. If a debit card is used as a means of payment in a 
pairwise trade, an increase in money supply leads to a proportional in- 
crease in money demand. That is, when money supply increases at a 
constant rate, a fixed record-keeping cost associated with the use of a 
debit card has no additional distortionary effect in the sense that there 
is no change in quantity of goods traded in the decentralized market 
except for a proportional increase in price. However, if cash is used in 
a pairwise trade, the carrying cost of cash proportional to its amount 
causes the cash balance net of cost to increase at a rate less than the 
money growth rate. Moreover, consumption smoothing leads to a relatively 
3 A survey by the Food Marketing Institute shows that the transaction cost of 
accepting a debit card is much more expensive than cash (Humphrey 2004).
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small decrease in quantity traded in comparison with the increase in 
cash balance, implying rigid price.
Finally, the means-of-payment mechanism underlying price rigidity 
implies that the welfare differences between debit-only and cash-only 
trades come from inefficiency due to a higher cost of carrying cash with 
an increase in money supply. For a zero cost of carrying cash, real 
balance for a cash trade is equal to that for a debit-card trade net of a 
fixed record-keeping cost. However, with a positive cost of carrying cash 
per unit, inflation has a distortionary effect on relative price between 
cash trade and debit-card trade in the sense that real cash balance and 
quantity of goods traded are less than those for a debit-card trade. This 
result implies that welfare cost of inflation is higher than that in the 
standard search-based model in which the quantity traded in exchange 
for money decreases with inflation because of its distortionary effect on 
intertemporal relative price.
These results are quite novel in the sense that sticky price is explic- 
itly derived from the consumer's choice of means of payment in response 
to monetary policy rather than menu costs as in Mankiw (1985).4 This 
result also provides an explanation for the dramatic differences in price 
rigidities across goods as documented in Bils and Klenow (2004) such 
that the rigidities of newspaper prices, taxi fares, and vehicle tolls are 
above average, whereas those of gasoline, airfares, and durable goods 
are below. The former group of goods is typically purchased by cash, 
whereas the latter group of goods is typically purchased by electronic 
forms of payment.
Further, our results imply that price rigidity should decline over time 
as record-keeping cost decreases with the development of information 
technology. This finding is consistent with that of Kackmeister (2007), 
which shows a substantial decrease in price rigidity during 1997-1999 
relative to that during 1889-1891. The decline in record-keeping cost 
expands the use of debit cards, which then makes prices more respon- 
sive to monetary policy and macroeconomic disturbances.
Studies on multiple means of payment have been conducted, includ- 
ing He et al. (2008) and Li (2008), in which agents can deposit their 
money in bank accounts and pay for goods using checks or debit cards. 
In Kim and Lee (2010), heterogeneous preferences are generated endo- 
4 Golosov and Lucas (2007) show that the size of the menu cost required to 
match the micro-data of price adjustment in an otherwise standard business 
cycle model is implausibly large to justify the menu-cost argument.
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genously by a non-degenerate wealth distribution across agents, and 
hence the fraction of agents using cash or a debit card is determined as 
an equilibrium outcome. Williamson (1999), Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), 
and Telyukova and Wright (2008) also introduce private money, capital, 
and credit into search-based models as competing means of payment 
with fiat money. However, these studies abstract from the relationship 
between means of payment and price dynamics in response to monetary 
policy.
II. Model
The basic setup comes from Lagos and Wright (2005), and Lagos 
(2010). Time is discrete. There is a [0, 1] continuum of agents who live 
forever with discount factor β∈(0, 1). In each period, there are two mar- 
kets, namely, frictionless centralized market (hereinafter CM) and fric- 
tional decentralized market (hereinafter DM), which open sequentially. 
There are three perishable and perfectly divisible consumption goods: 
apple, banana, and general good. All agents can produce and consume 
general goods in CM, whereas fruits (apple and banana) are endowed 
and traded in DM.
Money is the only object in this economy that can be storable across 
periods. Money is perfectly divisible, and total stock evolves determini- 
stically at the gross rate μ : i.e., Zt＝μZt－1, where Zt denotes the stock of 
money in CM at period t and μ≥1. Each agent receives lump-sum 
transfer of new money in the beginning of CM.
The rest of the model is best described following the sequence of events 
within a period. At the opening of CM, an idiosyncratic preference shock 
η t∈{a, b} arrives to each agent, which determines utility from consuming 
fruit in the following DM, where for simplicity Pr [η t＝a ]＝Pr [η t＝b]＝1/2. 
An agent with η t＝a obtains utility only from consuming apples, and an 
agent with η t＝b obtains utility only from consuming bananas in DM. 
After the realization of a preference shock, agents then produce and 
consume general goods. An agent obtains utility v(g) from consuming g 
units of general goods, where v”(g)＜0＜v’(g), v(0)＝0, and v’(0)＝∞. Each 
unit of general good is produced using one unit of labor which incurs 
one unit of disutility. A means of payment is also chosen together with 
money balance for pairwise trades in the decentralized fruit market by 
exchanging general goods for money.5 Agents who choose a debit card 
5 The means-of-payment choice can be interpreted as the portfolio choice of 
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as a means of payment can freely deposit their money into a debit-card 
account. The information on debit-card transactions is kept by the gov- 
ernment which has a technology for keeping records on transactions 
associated with debit-card accounts but not on agents' trading histories 
over time.
Although either cash or a debit card can be used as a means of pay- 
ment in DM, they are not identical assets in the sense that cash incurs 
the cost of carrying it into DM, whereas a debit card incurs record- 
keeping cost. As in the inventory-theoretic approach to money demand, 
such as in Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and more recently Freeman 
and Kydland (2000), we assume that the carrying cost of cash is pro- 
portional to its amount, whereas the record-keeping cost of a debit card 
is fixed regardless of its amount.6 Specifically, carrying a unit of cash 
incurs constant real cost of γm in the beginning of DM. This proportional 
cost includes forgone interest income as the opportunity cost of carrying 
cash. Alternatively, if interest income on the debit-card deposit is nor- 
malized to zero, this opportunity cost can be captured as negative interest 
income on cash carried around as a means of payment.
In DM, agents with η t＝a and η t＝b go to the apple market and banana 
market, respectively. An idiosyncratic endowment shock then arrives to 
each agent such that in the apple [banana] market, half of the agents 
are endowed with εa
h＝(1＋εa)F [εb
h＝(1＋εb)F ] units of apples [bananas], 
and the remaining half with εa
l＝(1－εa)F [εb
l＝(1－εb)F ] units of apples 
[bananas], where 0＜εa＜εb＜1 and F＞0. An agent obtains utility u(qη) 
from consuming qη units of fruit, where u”(qη)＜0＜u’(qη), u(0)＝0, and 
u’(εη
l) is sufficiently large.
After the realization of an endowment shock in DM, a low-endowment 
agent in each fruit market is randomly matched with a high-endowment 
agent. Hence, all pairwise meetings are single-coincidence meetings in 
which a low-endowment agent is a buyer and a high-endowment agent 
is a seller. Agents cannot make any binding intertemporal commitments, 
and their trading histories are private. Thus, all trades should be quid 
money balance between cash and debit-card deposit. This interpretation indicates 
a somewhat restrictive feature of the model in which a portfolio consisting of 
either cash only or debit-card deposit only is considered. However, this is not 
critical in the sense that no one holds a portfolio of both cash and debit-card 
deposit in the equilibrium (see footnote 11 for details). We are indebted to an 
anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this issue.
6 In Freeman and Kydland (2000), cash-holding cost is represented by trans- 
action cost (or shoe leather cost), as in Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).
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pro quo (see Kocherlakota 1998; Wallace 2001; Corbae et al. 2003; and 
Aliprantis et al. 2007). The terms of pairwise trade are determined by 
Nash bargaining in which a buyer has all the bargaining power.7 If a 
buyer uses a debit card in exchange for fruit, the corresponding amount 
of money is transferred from the buyer's account to the seller's account 
immediately, and a seller incurs a fixed record-keeping cost γd in terms 
of general good. Note that a flat fee per transaction and immediate clear- 
ance capture the features of online (PIN-based) debit cards.8 Finally, at 
the end of a period, debit-card deposit is returned to each agent according 
to the government record, and the next period is started with the end- 
of-trade wealth.
III. Equilibrium
To facilitate the description of an equilibrium, we first introduce some 
notations. Let φ t denote the unit price of money in period t in terms of 
general goods. We will drop the time subscript t hereinafter and index 
the next (previous) period variable by ＋1 (－1) to prevent confusion. Let 
W (z, η ) be the expected discounted utility of an agent entering CM with 
money balance z and preference shock η , and V (z, η ) be the expected 
discounted utility when the agent enters DM. The function W (z, η ) per- 
tains to after the realization of preference shock η∈{a, b} in CM, and  
V (z, η ) pertains to before the realization of endowment shock εη∈{εη
l , 
εη
h} in DM. In what follows, we will consider the equilibrium in which 
the real balance of money is constant in CM, φZ＝φ＋1 Z＋1, which implies 
φ/φ＋1＝μ .
7 Although the take-it-or-leave-it offer by a buyer is an extreme case of Nash 
bargaining, we do so to focus on the consumer side effects on price dynamics, 
such as the cost of antagonizing customers (Blinder et al. 1998), customer costs 
of price adjustment (Zbaracki et al. 2004), or the fear of consumer anger 
(Rotemberg 2005). In particular, Zbaracki et al. (2004) estimate that customer 
costs of price adjustment comprise 73.40%, whereas that for menu cost remains 
3.57%.
8 The pricing structure of fees for offline (signature-based) debit cards is very 
similar to that for credit cards. According to the “2005/2006 Study of Consumer 
Payment Preferences” conducted by the American Bankers Association and Dove 
Consulting, 16%, 10%, and 55% of debit-card holders use, respectively, online 
debit cards, offline debit cards, and online-cum-offline debit cards, to make in- 
store, internet, and bill payments. The remaining 20% of debit-card holders use 
neither form of debit cards.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS118
A. Centralized Market
In the frictionless CM, agents produce and consume general goods, 
and choose a means of payment together with money balance carried into 
DM. Hence, the problem for an agent entering CM with money balance 
z and preference shock η  is
( , , )
( , , )
max [ ( ) ( , )]
( , ) max







v g h V
W z







⎧ ⎫− + +⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬
− − +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭         
(1)
s.t. h＝g－φ (z＋T－ω i)                      (2)
g≥0, ω i≥0, h∈[0, h̅]                      
where σ η∈{σ a, σ b} with σ a∈[0, 1] and σ b∈[0, 1] denote the probability 
of choosing cash as a means of payment in exchange for apples and 
bananas in DM, respectively. Moreover, ω i∈{ω m, ω d} denotes the money 
balance carried into DM, where ω m and ω d are the cash balance and 
debit-card deposit, respectively, h is labor supply with h̅ denoting its 
upper bound, and T is a lump-sum transfer of new money, T＝(μ－1)Z－1
＋(1/φ－1)(γm M－1＋γd D－1) with M－1 and D－1 denoting aggregate cash 
holdings and the frequency of debit-card transactions in the previous 
period, respectively.9 We simply assume an interior solution for g and 
h.10 Substituting h from the budget constraint (2), we have
W(z, η )＝φ (z＋T )＋max{v(g)－g}＋max{σ η(v̅m,η－v̅d,η)＋v̅d,η}                          g                   σ η
where v̅m,η＝maxω m [V(ω
m, η )－φω m] and v̅d,η＝maxω d [V(ω
d, η )－φω d].
The first-order conditions with respect to g and ω i∈{ω m, ω d} are as 
follows:
v’(g)＝1                              (3)
9 Although the government cannot observe pairwise trades between agents, it 
always knows M－1 and D－1 because it keeps the information on debit-card ac- 
counts.
10 See Lagos and Wright (2005) for the conditions under which solutions of g 
and h are interior, respectively.
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∂                            (4)
where equality holds if ω i＞0. Further, an agent will choose to carry 
money balance in cash (σ η＝1) if v̅m,η＞v̅d,η, whereas an agent will choose 
to hold money balance in debit-card deposit (σ η＝0) if v̅m,η＜v̅d,η. We do 
not consider the case of a perfectly substitutable means of payment, 
where v̅m,η＝v̅d,η.11 Now, the envelope condition is
( , ) .W z
z
η φ∂ =
∂                           (5)
Condition (3) implies that all agents regardless of z or η∈{a, b} consume 
g*∈(0,∞) units of general goods such that v’(g*)＝1. Condition (4) deter- 
mines the money balance carried into DM, which depends only on η∈
{a, b} regardless of z. Condition (5) implies that the value function W(z, η ) 
is linear in z. Further, with the assumption of μ＞β , a buyer's take-it- 
or-leave-it offer implies a unique solution of ω i for each η∈{a, b}, as in 
Lagos and Wright (2005). Hence, wealth distribution across agents entering 
the decentralized fruit market for apple or banana is always degenerate.
B. Decentralized Market
There are two possible types of single-coincidence meetings in each of 
the decentralized fruit market depending on the debit card or cash used 
as a means of payment. The terms of trade (q, p) in a pairwise meeting 
are determined by the buyer's take-it-or-leave-it offer, where q denotes 
the quantity of fruit transferred by a seller, and p denotes the amount 
of money offered by a buyer.
Let U(q)≡u(ε l＋q)－u(ε l) and C(q)≡u(εh)－u(εh－q). Then, (qη, pη) for η
11 That is, we do not consider a portfolio of money balance that consists of 
both cash and debit-card deposit. Suppose that z̃ is the money balance carried 
to the decentralized fruit market. Let Θ＝(m, d) be a portfolio such that m＋d＝z̃, 
where m and d denote the cash balance and debit-card deposit, respectively. 
Now consider the following three portfolios: Θε＝(z̃－ε, ε ), Θm＝(z̃, 0), and Θd＝(0,  
z̃). It is straightforward to show that V(Θε, η )＜V(Θd, η ) from (11), (16), and the 
linearity of W. Then, cash only portfolio is optimal if max {V(Θm, η ), V(Θd, η )}＝
V(Θm, η ) because V(Θε, η )＜V(Θd, η )＜V(Θm, η ), whereas debit-card deposit only 
portfolio is optimal if max {V(Θm, η ), V(Θd, η )}＝V(Θd, η ) because V(Θε, η )＜V(Θd,
η ).
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∈{a, b} in the pairwise meeting between a buyer holding money balance 
ω  and a seller holding money balance ω̂ can be expressed as the solu- 
tion to the following problem:
max [U(qη)＋βEηW＋1(ω－pη, η )－βEηW＋1(ω , η )]
              pη≤ω, qη≥0
s.t. C(qη)＋γd Id≤β [EηW＋1(ω̂＋pη, η )－EηW＋1(ω̂, η )]
where Eη is the expectation with respect to η∈{a, b}, and Id is an indi- 
cator function taking the value of 1 if ω＝ω d and 0 otherwise. We assume 
a tie-breaking rule by which a seller agrees to any offer that makes him/ 
her indifferent between accepting and rejecting. The linear property of 
W simplifies the above problem as follows: 
max [U(qη)－βφ＋1pη ]                        (6)
                               pη≤ω, qη≥0





( ) if ( )
d d
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ω βφ ω γ ε
ω βφ ω γ ε
+
+
− ≥⎧⎪= ⎨ − <⎪⎩
I
I            (8)
where ω̅＝[C(εη F)＋γd Id]/βφ＋1.
Notice that εη F represents the efficient or first-best quantity of fruit 
traded, which equates the marginal utility of fruit consumption with its 
marginal disutility. If a buyer holds a sufficiently large amount of real 
balance so that βφ＋1ω－γd Id≥C(εη F), he/she gets εη F units of fruit in 
exchange for the real balance of C(εη F)＋γd Id. If βφ＋1ω－γd Id＜C(εη F), 
however, a buyer spends all the real balances in exchange for qη units 
of fruit, which solves C(qη)＝βφ＋1ω－γd Id. Note also that, as in other 
variations of Lagos and Wright (2005), the terms of trade depend only 
on the buyer's wealth regardless of the seller's wealth.
Now, the Bellman equation for a buyer (low-endowment agent) with 
ω m balance of cash (σ η＝1) satisfies
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m, η ]             (9)
where ω̃m≡[1－(γm/φ )]ω
m is the cash balance net of its carrying cost. Here, 
by the bargaining solutions, (qη
m, pη
m)＝(εη F, C(εη F )/βφ＋1) if βφ＋1 ω̃
m≥
C(εη F) and (qη
m, pη
m)＝(C－1(βφ＋1ω̃
m), ω̃m) otherwise. The corresponding 
Bellman equation for a seller (high-endowment agent) satisfies
1 { }( , ) { [ ( ( ) ) ( ( ), ) ] m
s m h m m mV u q W pη η η η ω ωω η ε ω β ω ω η+ == − + +∫ 1E            
(10)
         1 { }[ ( ( ) ) ( ( ) / , )] } ( )d
h d m d
du q W p dη η η η ω ωε ω β ω ω γ φ η ω+ =+ − + + − 1 FE
where F(ω ) is the wealth distribution across buyers (low-endowment 
agents), and 1{χ } is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if and 
only if χ  is true. Based on (9) and (10), together with the linearity of W 
and degenerate distribution of wealth across agents, the expected utility 
of an agent entering DM with ωm balance of cash, before knowing the 
endowment shock, can be written as
1
1( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( , ).
2
m l m h m mV u q u q Wη η η η ηω η ε ε β ω η+= + + − + E        
(11)
From (11), the first derivative of V(ω m, η ) with respect to ω m∈[0, ω̅ ] 
becomes12
1
( ) ( )( , ) 11 .
2 ( )
l m h mm
mm m
u q u qV
C q
η η η η
η
ε εω η ββφ γ
ω μ+
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤′ ′+ − − ⎛ ⎞∂ ⎪ ⎪= + −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬ ⎜ ⎟′∂ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭   
 (12)
By substituting (12) into (4), we obtain the condition that determines 












m) represents the ex- 
pected marginal benefit of cash carried into the decentralized fruit market 
for a pairwise trade.
12 The slope of V(ω m, η ) at ω m＝ω̅  is the limiting case from below.
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Similarly, the Bellman equation for a buyer with ωd balance of debit- 






d, η ],            (14)
where (qη
d, pη
d)＝(εη F, C(εη F)/βφ＋1) if βφ＋1ω






d) otherwise. The corresponding Bellman equation for 
a seller satisfies
1 { }( , ) { [ ( ( ) ) ( ( ), ) ] m
s d h m d mV u q W pη η η η ω ωω η ε ω β ω ω η+ == − + +∫ 1E        
(15)
            1 { }[ ( ( ) ) ( ( ), ) ] } ( )d
h d d du q W p dη η η η ω ωε ω β ω ω η ω+ =+ − + + 1 FE
where ω̆d＝ωd－(γd/φ ) is the money balance net of the record-keeping cost. 
Then, the linearity of W and degenerate distribution of wealth across 
agents imply that the expected utility of an agent entering DM with ωd 
balance of debit-card deposit, before knowing the endowment shock, can 
be written as
1
1( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( , )
2
d l d h d dV u q u q Wη η η η ηω η ε ε β ω η+= + + − + E          
(16)
where ω̃d＝ωd－(1/2)(γd/φ ).
Substituting the following first derivative of V(ωd, η ) with respect to 
ωd∈[0, ω̅ ] into (4)
1
( ) ( )( , ) 11 ,
2 ( )
l d h dd
d d
u q u qV
C q
η η η η
η
ε εω η βφ
ω +
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤′ ′+ − −∂ ⎪ ⎪= + ⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬′∂ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭        
 (17)












d) represents the ex- 
pected marginal benefit of a debit-card deposit held for a pairwise trade 
in the decentralized fruit market.
Now, for a given cost of carrying cash per unit γm and a fixed record- 
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keeping cost γd, an equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. For a given pair of (γm, γd), an equilibrium is the se- 
quences of an allocation, price, terms of trade, and means of payment 
such that for η∈{a, b}
(i) {gη,t, hη,t, ωη,t }
∞
t＝0 satisfies (2), (3), and (13) or (18);
(ii) {qη,t, pη,t }
∞
t＝0 satisfies (7) and (8);
(iii) φ t clears the centralized money market Σηωη,t/2＝Zt for all t; and
(iv) v̅m,η＞v̅d,η implies the use of cash as a means of payment (ση＝1), 
and v̅m,η＜v̅d,η implies the use of a debit card as a means of payment (ση
＝0).
IV. Means of Payment and Price Changes
For a given pair of (γm, γd), there are potentially four types of equilibria 
depending on the choice of means of payment ση∈{σa, σb} in DM: (i) (σa, 
σb)＝(1, 1), where cash is used in both apple and banana markets; (ii) 
(σa, σb)＝(0, 0), where a debit card is used in both apple and banana mar- 
kets; (iii) (σa, σb)＝(1, 0), where cash is used in the apple market, and a 
debit card is used in the banana market; and (iv) (σa, σb)＝(0, 1), where 
a debit card is used in the apple market, and cash is used in the banana 
market.
In the first two types of equilibria, where (σa, σb)＝(1, 1) and (σa, σb)＝
(0, 0), respectively, money balances of the banana-market participants are 
greater than those of the apple-market participants. The given endow- 
ment of fruits with εa＜εb implies a relatively large quantity traded in the 
banana market compared with that in the apple market. The banana- 
market participants are then required to hold a relatively large amount 
of money balance.



























. In both (σa, σb)＝(0, 0) and (σa, σb)＝(1, 1) equilibria, ωa＜ωb＜ω̅.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
The following lemma shows that, among the four potential types of 
equilibria, the (σa, σb)＝(0, 1) equilibrium does not exist. Hence, if both 
cash and a debit card are used as the means of payment in the decen- 
tralized fruit market, apple-market participants use cash (σa＝1), where- 
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as banana-market participants use a debit card (σb＝0). Further, as in 
Lemma 1, the money balances of the banana-market participants are 
greater than those of the apple-market participants.
Lemma 2. If cash is used in one of the two decentralized fruit markets, 





Proof. See Appendix. ■
This lemma also implies that cash and a debit card become the main 
means of payment for small and large transactions, respectively, which 
is in accordance with Prescott (1987), Li (2008), and Kim and Lee (2010). 
Further, it is consistent with the findings of Bounie and Francois (2009) 
from the diary data in France that the average sizes for cash and debit- 
card transaction are 10.8 Euro and 51.3 Euro, respectively.
Finally, the following proposition specifies the equilibrium restrictions 
on a fixed record-keeping cost γd for a given carrying cost of cash per 
unit γm.
Proposition 1. For a given γm＞0, (σa, σb )＝(1, 1) for a sufficiently large 
γd, (σa, σb)＝(0, 0) for a sufficiently small γd, and (σa, σb)＝(1, 0) for γd 
that is neither too small nor too large.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
A. Cash Is Used in All Trades
We are now ready to discuss price dynamics beginning with the (σa, 
σb)＝(1, 1) equilibrium in which only cash is used as a means of payment. 
According to Proposition 1, this type of equilibrium exists if the record- 
keeping cost is sufficiently large relative to the carrying cost of cash.
Proposition 2. In the (σa, σb)＝(1, 1) equilibrium, the inflation rate of fruit 
price is less than the money growth rate μ .











η∈{a, b} satisfies [(μ/β )＋(γm/φ )]＝L(qη
m) in (14). As ω̃η
m＝C(qη
m)/βφ＋1, 
πm can be rewritten as
1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
( )/ ( )/
.
( )/ ( )/
m m m m
m
m m m m
C q q C q q
C q q C q q
η η η η





− − − −
= =
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Together with the strict convexity of C(q), qη
m＜qη
m
,－1 due to φ＜φ－1 and 
L’(qη









Intuitively, price rigidity in the cash-only equilibrium comes from the 
different adjustment rates between quantity traded and cash balance 
offered in response to a change in money supply over time. As the stock 
of money increases at a rate of μ  so that the value of money (in terms 
of general goods) decreases over time (φ＋/φ＝1/μ ), the carrying cost of 
cash per unit, γm/φ, increases. Therefore, the cash balance net of carry- 
ing cost, ω̃η
m＝[1－(γm/φ )]ωη
m, increases at a rate less than μ .13 If the 
difference between μ  and (ω̃m/ω ̃tm－1) is covered by a sufficient decrease 
in the quantity of fruit traded qm, then the inflation rate of fruit price 
would be identical to the money growth rate (πt
m
＝μ ).14 However, the de- 
crease in qm is relatively small, as C”(q)＝－u”(εη
h－q)＞0, which reflects 
consumption smoothing with concave utility function. That is, as shown 
in the proof of Proposition 2, the real balance required to compensate 
for a seller's loss from transferring a unit of fruit to a buyer (C(qη
m)/qη
m) 
becomes smaller as qm declines; therefore, the inflation rate of fruit price 
is less than the money growth rate μ .
B. Debit Card is Used in All Trades
We now analyze the debit-only equilibrium that exists for a sufficiently 
small record-keeping cost relative to the carrying cost of cash.
Proposition 3. In the (σa, σb)＝(0, 0) equilibrium, the inflation rate of fruit 
price is equal to the money growth rate μ .
Proof. The inflation rate of fruit price in this equilibrium can be written 
as
1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
/ [ ( ) ] / [ ( ) ] /
/ [ ( ) ] / [ ( ) ] /
d d d d d d
d dd
d d d d d d
d d
q C q q C q q
q C q q C q q
η η η η η η
η η η η η η
ω γ β φ γ
π μ
ω γ β φ γ
+
− − − − − −
⎧ ⎫+ +⎪ ⎪= = = ⎨ ⎬+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
13 As ω̃m＝[1－(γm /φ )]ωm and ω＋m1＝μωm by the market clearing condition, (ω̃tm/ 
ω̃t
m
－1)＝{ [1－(γm/φ )]μ ω－m1}/{[1－(γm/φ－1)]ω－m1}＝μ { [1－(γm/φ )]/[1－(γm/φ－1)]}. As 
(γm/φ )＞(γm /φ－1), 1－(γm/φ )＜1－(γm/φ－1). Hence, (ω̃ tm/ω̃ tm－1)＜μ .




SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS126
where qη
d for each η∈{a, b} satisfies (μ/β )＝L(qη




,－1, which immediately implies π
d＝μ . ■
When a debit card is used in all trades, there is no change in the 
quantity of fruit traded over time. Hence, the real balance of money net 




γd. Then, as γd is fixed irrespective of the transaction amount and φ 
decreases at a rate of 1/μ  (i.e., φ＝μφ＋1), the money balance in a debit- 
card account should increase at a rate of μ  (i.e., ωd＝μω－
d
1). That is, in 
this type of equilibrium, monetary expansion is completely absorbed by 
an increase in nominal money demand.
C. Both Cash and Debit Card are Used in Trades
We finally examine the equilibrium in which both cash and a debit 
card are used as means of payment. As discussed in Proposition 1, this 
type of equilibrium exists if record-keeping cost is neither too large nor 
too small relative to the carrying cost of cash.
Proposition 4. In the (σa, σb)＝(1, 0) equilibrium, the inflation rate of 
the apple price is strictly less than that of the banana price.









,－1), is the same as π
m in Proposition 2. 
Similarly, as a debit card is used in the banana market, the inflation 








,－1), is the same as π
d in 
Proposition 3. Therefore, we have πa＝πm＜μ＝πb＝πd. ■
Propositions 4 and 1 suggest that the overall degree of price rigidity 
should decline over time, as the record-keeping cost decreases with the 
development of information technology. The reason is that an increasing 
fraction of debit-card transactions (relative to cash transactions) facilitates 
a more flexible price adjustment. This prediction is also consistent with 
that of Kackmeister (2007) in which price was found considerably more 
rigid during 1889-1891 than during 1997-1999. Mester (2006) also shows 
that the fraction of households using debit cards increased from 18% to 
60% during 1995-2004.
Further, this result can account for the dramatic differences in price 
rigidities across goods, as reported in Bils and Klenow (2004). That is, 
prices of goods usually paid in cash (e.g., newspapers, taxi fares, vehicle 
tolls, and parking fees) fall at the sticky extreme, whereas prices of goods 
usually paid by electronic means of payment (e.g., gasoline, airfare, and 
durable goods) are relatively flexible.
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V. Welfare Implications
In an inflationary economy, the distortionary effect of an increasing cost 
of carrying cash per unit (γm/φ t) on the quantity of goods traded and 
the consequent price rigidity imply extra wedge in the welfare cost of 
inflation. To see this effect, we consider the (σa, σb)＝(1, 0) equilibrium 
and let W(Φ) denote the expected discounted utility for an economy with 
the real balance of Φ＝φZ in CM. As cash and a debit card are used in 
the decentralized market for apple and banana, respectively, W(Φ) can 


























Φ＋1 in the equilibrium of our interest. By repeated substitution, we obtain
,
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
1 4(1 ) 4
d m
b a t




Φ = + +















, t＋2＞…  
from (13) because of a decreasing φ t＋τ at the rate of μ .
Based on (13) and (18), if γm＝0, the real balance for cash trade in 
the apple market is equivalent to that net of a fixed record-keeping cost 
γd for a debit-card trade. As the real balance for cash trade with γm＞0 
is less than that for a debit-card trade, the quantity of apple traded ac- 
cordingly is less than that with γm＝0. Therefore, following Bailey (1956), 
the welfare cost of cash trade due to γm/φ t (net of γd) for a given μ  can 
be written as
,
1 [ ( ) ( ) ] 0
4
d m




β +≡ − = − >∑C W W U U
           (19)




Note that Cμ＞0 implies that the welfare cost of inflation is larger than 
that in the existing search-based models of exchange. In Lagos and 
Wright (2005), additional welfare cost of inflation comes from sharing the 
bargaining power between a buyer and a seller, whereas, here, it comes 
from the carrying cost of cash per unit (γm/φ t). For example, suppose μ
＝1 in an economy A and μ ’＞1 in an economy B. Thus, the welfare 
15 As (1/2){[u’(ε l＋qm)/u’(εh－qm)]＋1}＝L(qm)＞L(qd)＝(1/2){[u’(ε l＋qd)/u’(εh－qd)]
＋1}, Στ β τ {[u(εal＋qad)＋u(εah－qad)]－[u(εal＋qam, t＋τ )＋u(εah－qam, t＋τ )]}＞0.
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－WA)]          
 (20)
                ＝[Wd
A－Wd
B ]＋[Cμ’－Cμ ].
Now, suppose Pr[η t＝a]＝α  and Pr[η t＝b]＝(1－α ) denote the fraction 
of cash trade and debit-card trade, respectively, in the decentralized fruit 
market. The first term on the right-hand side in (20) can be written as
1 (1 ) (1 )ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 2 2
d d d d
d d a b a bq q q q
α α α α
β
⎧ ⎫− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = + − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
W W U U U UA B
(21)
        







where q̂d satisfies (18) with μ＝1 (economy A ) and q̆d satisfies (18) with 





















) for a given μ≥1. Notice that (21) 
captures the distortionary effect of inflation on the intertemporal relative 
price, which is the typical welfare cost of inflation in a search-based 
model of exchange.
The second term on the right-hand side in (20) can be expressed as
, ,ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ]2
d m d m
a a t a a tq q q q
τ τ
μ μ τ τ
τ τ
α β β′ + +
⎧ ⎫− = − − −⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑C C U U U U
   
(22)
where q̂
m and q̆m satisfy (13) with μ＝1 (economy A ) and μ ’＞1 (econ- 
omy B), respectively. Notice that the carrying cost of cash per unit 
(γm/φ t) increases with μ  as φ t decreases over time, implying a fall in 
cash balance and quantity traded. Hence, (22) is positive as long as β 
is not sufficiently small. This equation captures the additional welfare 
cost of inflation due to an increase in (γm/φ t). In short, inflation has an 
additional distortionary effect on relative price between cash trade and 
debit-card trade.
This welfare implication also suggests that welfare cost of inflation 
should decrease over time because of a decline in cash trade. Indeed, as 
record-keeping cost decreases with the development of information tech- 
nology, debit-card trade has increased substantially, whereas cash trade 
has decreased steadily. According to Humphrey (2004), the share of cash 
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in legal consumer payments decreased from 31% to 20% during 1974- 
2000, whereas the share of debit cards increased rapidly to 7% during 
the 1990s. Moreover, the “Study of Consumer Payment Preferences” con- 
ducted by the American Bankers Association and Dove Consulting show 
that during 1999-2008, in-store purchases paid by cash decreased from 
39% to 29%, whereas those paid by online debit cards increased from 
11% to 20%. Notice that (Wd
A－Wd
B ) in (21) does not depend on the 
fraction of cash trade α∈(0, 1), whereas (Cμ ’－Cμ) in (22) decreases as α 
declines. Therefore, the welfare cost of inflation (WA－WB) in (20) should 
decrease as the fraction of cash transactions (α ) falls with the develop- 
ment of information technology.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the means-of-payment mechanism to provide 
one of the possible micro-foundations for price rigidity in response to 
monetary policy. We incorporate a trade-off between cash and a debit 
card as means of payment in the sense that a buyer incurs the carrying 
cost of cash proportional to its amount, whereas a seller accepting a debit 
card bears a fixed record-keeping cost regardless of transaction amount. 
In an inflationary economy where money supply increases at a constant 
rate, cash balance increases over time at a rate less than the money 
growth rate because of a higher cost of carrying cash with an increase 
in money supply. Consumption smoothing implies a relatively small de- 
crease in quantity of goods traded compared with an increase in cash 
balance, implying price rigidity.
So far, we have discussed the relationship between price rigidity and 
means of payment for the purchase of a single good or service, such as 
newspaper, taxi fare, vehicle toll, gasoline, airfare, and durable goods, 
as noted in Knotek (2010). However, if a certain good is purchased to- 
gether with other goods, a buyer would consider the total amount of 
transaction rather than the price of individual goods in the choice of 
means of payment. Our model suggests that a buyer should use a debit 
card to pay a relatively large amount for those goods that tend to be pur- 
chased altogether such as fruits, vegetables, and dairy products, which 
implies the relatively flexible prices of the agricultural products, as shown 
in Bils and Klenow (2004).
Finally, empirical studies with extensive data on the payment patterns 
should be indispensable to understand the importance of the mechanism 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS130
for nominal price rigidity associated with means of payment. We leave 
this to future work.
(Received 4 May 2011; Revised 19 July 2011; Accepted 7 September 
2011)
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose a debit card is used as a means of pay- 
ment in all trades. As C’(qη )＝u’(εη
h－qη
d), from (18), we have
( ) ( )1 .
2 ( )
l d h d
h d
u q u q
u q




⎡ ⎤′ ′+ + −
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. The exact same arguments in the case in 












































l. Therefore, in either case, ω a＜ω b 
because C’(qη)＝u’(εη
h－qη)＞0. Finally, we need to show that ω b＜ω̅. As 
ω̅ is the money balance corresponding to the first-best quantity of fruit 
traded, it suffices to show that qb
i＜εb F for i∈{m, d}. Consider the (σa,
σb)＝(0, 0) equilibrium. Then, qb
d satisfies
1 ( ) ( )( ) .
2 ( )
l d h d
d b b b b
b h d
b b




⎡ ⎤′ ′+ + −= = ⎢ ⎥′ −⎣ ⎦
L
Thus, L(0)＞(μ/β ) because u’(εb
l
















∈[0, εb F] is
2
[ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( ) ] [ ( )]( ) 0
[ ( )]
l d h d h d l d
d b b b b b b b b
b h d
b b
u q u q u q u qq
u q
ε ε ε ε
ε
′′ ′ ′′ ′+ − + − +′ = <
′ −
L
where L’(εb F ) is the limiting case from below. Therefore, qb
d
 satisfying 
(18) is strictly less than εb F. Similar arguments for the equilibrium (σa,
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σb)＝(1, 1) give the result qb
m＜εb F.
Proof of Lemma 2: As (μ/β )＝L(qη
d) from (18), (13) can be rewritten 
as (γm/φ )＝L(qη
m)－L(qη
d). Through a simple manipulation of this equation 
using C’(qη)＝u’(εη
h－qη), we have
( ) ( )1 .
2 ( ) ( )
l m l d
m
h m h d
u q u q
u q u q
η η η η
η η η η
ε εγ
φ ε ε





h－qη) decreases with qη and (γm/
φ )＞0. As εa＜εb implies qa＜qb in equilibrium, the smaller outcome qη
m 
should be the quantity for apples traded (qa
m
), and the larger outcome 
qη






 is again an 
obvious consequence of C’(qη)＝u’(εη
h－qη)＞0. Finally, the proof of ωb
d
＜ω̅ is the same as the last part of the proof of Lemma 1.






















d satisfy (13) and (18), respectively, for a given (γd, γm). As v̅d,η＝U̅η
d
＋βEηW＋1(0, η ) and v̅m,η＝U̅η
m＋βEηW＋1(0, η ), it suffices to compare U̅η
d 
and U̅η
m to choose the means of payment. (i) By Lemma 2, if cash is 
used in the banana market, then it is also the case in the apple market. 
As ∂φ/∂γd＝(1/βωb
d)＞0, γd gives an effect on U̅b
m through φ. Specifical- 
ly, ∂U̅b
m/∂γd＞0 because




l m h m m mb
b b b b b b
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γ φ γ γ μ γ
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m for γd＝0 with γm＞0. Therefore, for a 
given γm＞0, γ ̃db＞0 such that U̅bd(γ ̃db)＝U̅bm(γ ̃db) is well defined. Then, if γd 
is greater than γ ̃db, U̅bd(γd)＜U̅bm(γd), and hence cash is superior to a debit 
card as a means of payment. (ii) By Lemma 2 again, it suffices to show 
that a debit card is used in the apple market. The exact same argument 
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in (i) implies that in the apple market, γ ̃da＞0 such that U̅ad(γ ̃da)＝U̅am(γ ̃da) 
is well defined for a given γm＞0. Then, if γd is less than γ ̃da, U̅ad(γd)＞  
U̅a
m
(γd), and hence a debit card is superior to cash as a means of pay- 
ment. (iii) As claimed in (i) and (ii), for a given γm＞0, γ ̃da and γ ̃db such 
that
1
1 1[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
2 2
d m d m m a
a a a a m a dq q
β βφ β φ ω ω γ ω γ
μ μ+
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − − + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
U U
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2 2
d m d m m b
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β βφ β φ ω ω γ ω γ
μ μ+
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − − + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
U U
are well defined. From the above, we have
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, we have 
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m m h h
b a b a
m








































for γm＞0. Now, if γd∈(γ ̃da, γ ̃db), U̅ad(γd)＜U̅am(γd) and U̅bd(γd)＞U̅bm(γd), and 
hence cash is used in the apple market, and a debit card is used in the 
banana market.
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